Summary
Started as a social intervention tool to alleviate poverty, microfinance has moving more towards a regular business. Microfinance institution is now expected to generate profit from the fund lent not only to cover its operational cost but also as a return to its investor. The more business oriented microfinance institutions has raised questions on their social nature. Mission drift, a condition of MFI deviating from its original social mission due to commercialization, is then identified and brought to many discussion tables. Having reviewed the commercialization process of microfinance institutions the paper concludes two motives of MFI pursuing profit: financial sustainability and market expansion. This paper presumed that these two different motives should lead the MFI into a different path: one that will keep them on the original-social track and the other that turns them away from it. A different path which fundamentally influenced by the ideological background of the institutions, the paper further presumes.
A beginning of a new era
Kicking off the start line, yet crossing the finish line, microfinance has currently entered a new level of ball game. Begin as a social intervention tool and operating on donor funds, MFIs have now developed into more than just a humanitarian aid program and operating with wider source of fund. Broad range of products and services has been offered which now includes insurance and saving products. Microfinance has no longer been only the interest of philanthropists, social activists, NGOs, and government body but also private investors, investment funds and big commercial financial companies. Various model of operation has been introduced for a better performance, socially and financially.
Statistical wise, numbers have been upsized convincingly. Simply looking at the MixMarket’s benchmark series during the period of 1999-2008 as a rough proxy of growth, number of reporting MFIs skyrocketed from 57 to 1,084 institutions and on average, the active borrowers upsurge to 69,277 borrowers from just 36,795 borrowers whilst gross loan portfolio went up high to US$34.9Mio in 2008 compared to US$23.2Mio in 1999.
Funds are also floating fast. The MicroRate’s 5th annual survey of microfinance investment vehicle (MIV)[1] of 2010 reveals a strong growth in MIV assets over the past five years (2005-2009). Assets have flourished to USD 6.0bn in 2009 from a meager of USD 1.2bn back in 2005. With 78 MIV involved in the 2010, the average assets is recorded at USD 76.9mio, outstandingly stands over the 2005 average of USD 2.9mio with 41 MIV included in the survey. Furthermore, scrolling down the survey report, more than half of the participants forecasted additional USD 2bn of investment over the year of 2010.
With the strong growth over the past period, along with the promising future growth which remains intact, MFI that was known as a social-non-profit organization has now developed into a financial industry serving the poor as the market. Another start flag has been waived, a new industry era has been launched, and new challenges have been put in place.
When the micro acts like a macro
The recent development has not only changed how microfinance is being viewed but also how the institution is operated. MFIs are currently urged to reduce their dependency on grant, donor fund and other forms of subsidy funding and be more self-sufficient. The argument was based on the premise that the sustainability of microfinance program can only be attained by making the institutions financially sustainable through non subsidy funding.
Many have argued that subsidy-funded microfinance institutions will not translate to a successful program. Harper (1998) argued that subsidized microfinance program tends to be temporary as it aims to achieve certain objective, hence it is not planned to be permanent. Moreover, some form of subsidy is considered to have a damaging effect as it conceals the potential profit and efficiency because there is no urgency to demonstrate profitability and efficiency. Morduch (1999), in his review of Bangladesh’s Grameen bank, shows that despite of high repayment rate, excluding subsidy, the bank operates on losses in any year of its operation. As such, this condition forces microfinance institution to keep relying on donor funds or subsidy, thus questioning the ability of the institution to operate sustainably. Strengthening the premise, Pollinger, Outhwaite and Guzman (2007) assert that even a modest pricing inefficiency has a significant impact on the amount of subsidy needed to maintain sustainability.
The quest of sustainability has shifted the capital structure of microfinance institutions. Tracking down 29 microfinance institutions in “MicroRate29”[2], Farrington (2002) identified three trends in regards to the liabilities side of MFI’s balance sheet: increasing leverage, growing deposit, and decreasing portion of subsidy funding. With the spirit of enhancing growth, MFIs eagerly seek for private funds to restructure their balance sheet, tasks which MFIs will not found so hard considering strong growth of investors’ interest in the sector.
Additionally, the uprising competition environment embedded in the growing industry and more private investment funding the institution have urged microfinance institutions to act more like an regular business institutions. The issue of profitability, operation efficiency, performance evaluation, risk management and good governance has never been so important than those are today. Efficient pricing and cost reduction are now a great concern for every MFI in pursuing profit not only to preserve its sustainability but also to provide return to the investors. Thus, Business paradigm is now officially added to the existing social paradigm.
When the macro goes micro
Look at this world’s statistics. As of 2005, 1.4billion people live under extreme poverty living on less than $1.25 per day comprising 20% of the 7.0billion total world population.[3] Estimation of 2.5billion adults worldwide are without access to even basic financial services. With these statistics in mind, now take a look at the followings. Researching on 315 microfinance institutions, Cull et. al (2008) reported a 57% of the sample institutions were profitable while serving 87% of all borrowers. The MIX 2009 benchmarks show an average of 5.3% return earned by MFI investors on their equity (ROE) with Asia booking the highest average of 29.6% compare to the other regions. Summing up all the statistics, one would easily conclude that micromarket is not really micro after all; in contrast it is huge and profitable.
The above delivers very good news also for those who previously not interested in doing business with the poor. The success stories of MFI and the market potential behind poverty had apparently enticed not only social investors but also those who are purely seeking profits including big well-established commercial financial institutions.
For commercial financial institutions, the micromarket is becoming more and more appealing as their traditional market becoming more and more saturated. Overheated competition in the industry has squeezed the income earned forcing them not to rely on their traditional source of income and to go out seeking new market and new source of income. With huge numbers of potential customers which are yet being served, not to say being exploited, micromarket provides such market and profit-making opportunities as a substitution to the saturated-original market and topping up the squeezed margin earned.
As these commercial financial institutions mark their way to the market, the commercialization trend of microfinance is getting stronger. These new players arrive in the market driven by the intention of making profit and not of alleviating poverty. The poor that once is left behind is now an attraction for everyone. Hence, a new color, a very bright one, has been added. Microfinance is now too commercial and not only be social.
Holy mission at stake!
Though they go through a different tunnel, the two processes previously discussed come to the same end: profit. Despite of the motives of pursuing profit, the profit oriented microfinance has raised questions on the present stance of the microfinance institution in terms of its development mission.
Many have worried that the quest for profit may turn microfinance institutions away from its original mission of eradicating poverty. Business paradigm being added might not go work hand-in-hand with the social paradigm as it seems stand on far different corners. Profit might no longer be considered only as the necessary condition of sustainability but also as the main measure of performance since MFIs are required to provide returns to the investors. As profit is being pursued the social mission is left far behind.
The problem is even more obvious in the case of commercial fund entering the market where profit is its sole underlying motive. Though the entrance of these new players may increase the competitiveness of the market which in turn will benefit the customers in terms of products choice and pricing efficiency, the strong business motives will more likely cause the interest of the investors being top-prioritized above that of the customers. In such way, microfinance will no longer serve the interest of the poor which should actually be the main beneficiary of microfinance.
In seeking profit, MFIs tend to concentrate on the revenue side rather than the cost side. Raising up the interest earned on the fund lent is likely preferable instead of lowering down the cost of serving the poor. This scaling-up process mainly involved two common strategies: increasing loan size and increasing interest rate. Either way, the two will barely benefit the poor as customers.
Though increasing loan size may not necessarily indicate a mission drift phenomenon, it is often intended to avoid loan arrears and monitoring cost to leverage the profitability. In doing so, MFIs tend to target better-off clients in priority (Armendariz & Szafarz, 2009). This scaling-up process has shifted the MFI’s clientele base upward to the wealthier ones as bigger loan size is not affordable for the very poor. Hence, larger loan size means less outreach and less poverty alleviation impact. This too shall evident that the profit-making behavior may lead MFI drifting away from its social mission.
The Nobel Prize winner, the pioneer of microcredit and the founder of Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank, Mohamad Yunus has once said that the spirit of providing credit to poor is to fight loan sharks and not creating one. Yunus’ gloomy concern was triggered by the practice of raising interest rate charged on microloan to boost profitability whereas the rate may be exceeded the capability of the poor to repay such an expensive loan. In addition, this higher cost sometimes is also accompanied by hidden cost and heavy penalty. A striking example, the controversial-publicly-listed Compartamos charge more than 90% interest rate per anum whilst non-government MFIs charge the borrowers 25% per year on average compared to average of 13% charged by commercial banks (Cull, Kunt & Morduch, 2008). Surprisingly, the same case happened in the well-known Grameen Bank itself as Mannan (2010) intriguingly argue that contrary to the popular notion that Grameen Bank imposes interest rate as high as 54% p.a if all hidden costs are taken into account.
One can also argue that the profit-seeking behavior may be justified as long as most of the profit earned is distributed back for the maximum benefit of the poor. However, the adverse effect of the behavior as discussed above possessed a significant potential for MFI to drifting away. The big challenge is then balancing the profit earned with the social impact, keeping the interest of the poor on the top of the list while pursuing profit. By pursuing better profitability, MFIs are risking their holy mission which previously was the reason of their birth: poverty alleviation. The bet is now on the table!
What makes them different?
The previous discussion noted two different forces behind the MFI’s profit-seeking behavior: financial sustainability and market expansion. The necessity of financial sustainability demands MFIs to be less-subsidy dependent so that profit is required not only to cover the operational cost but also to attract investors’ funds substituting donor aid, grant and any form of subsidy funding. The saturated conventional financial market leads the commercial financial institutions to go into the micromarket for the sake of market expansion. These commercial financial institutions see microfinance purely within the business paradigm where profit is their main objective.
The negativity of the profit-seeking behavior has been widely discussed earlier in the paper. Simply put, profits are possibly made at the expense of the poor – the true beneficiary of microfinance. However, the two different motives underlying this more business-oriented behavior highlighted a fundamental issue behind the mission drift phenomenon. It is not simply the profit which causes the MFI to drift away from the social mission; but the reason of why they are pursuing profit that is. Philosophy wise, it is the organization’s value derived from the ideology background that have the most influence on how the MFI will behave towards profit.
In the organizational context, the behavior of an organization is highly influenced by its own culture stemmed by the value or beliefs underlying the formation of the organization. This long-believed value will be the basic assumption of the culture that shape the goals of the organization, the way of how the organization is operated to achieve the goals and how it will interact with the surroundings. Moreover, it will justify what the organization does, how it is done and why it is done (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2010).
In the social context, the value that determines the behavior is known as ideology. It is a set of value or beliefs in regards to how everything should be. Ideology is a normative statement that has empirical implication in a sense that it will influence human behavior. As cited by Hertley (1983), the interlink of ideology and industrial-relation system has been a subject of growing interest in social sciences which have made a great contribution in explaining the important role of ideology as an explanatory variable of an organization. In short, ideology is the main determinant of organizational behavior and the main tool to legitimate its goals.
In the context of our discussion, different ideology will thus differ the way how each microfinance institutions perceive profits. Institutions with strong social ideology will see profit only as a prerequisite condition of sustainability in order to provide better product and services to their poor customers. As poverty alleviation remains the legitimate objective, profit will be pursued not at the expense of the customers’ interest on contrary most of the benefit will be returned back to the poor in form of better products and more value-added services. Hence, these institutions will have better immunity to resist the attraction of drifting than those with weak or none social ideology.
It is surely true that the profit-seeking behavior expose all microfinance institutions, whether it is commercial or non-commercial, to a risk of mission drift. However, being a profit seeker not inevitably curse the institution to be a drifted MFI. It all depends on how strong the social value has been planted and internalized in the institution since the first day of its operation. Quoting Carlos Danel[4], the risk of drifting starts since the day the institution was founded. An MFI founded on the basis of market expansion with profit as its ultimate goal is already drifting since the first time it was founded. These MFIs are here in the market to drift. Even for those founded on the basis of social mission does not entirely free from the risk of drifting from their mission. But at least these institutions are already equipped with the fundamental safeguard keeping them on track: the ideology.
How it will be different
The poor should be the central attention of any microfinance institutions. Poverty alleviation should be the main theme of their every single operation. Social mission should lie in the very core of the institution’s value. Whether it is for-profit or non-profit microfinance institutions, the previous should remain the foundation and the framework underpinning the whole operation. Here is where social ideology will make the different.
On the very start, the social ideology will influence microfinance institutions in regards to the way they see their clients and their position to the clients. Social MFIs will see the clients as those in needs for help and themselves as the clients’ savior helping them out of poverty. Hence, the so-called graduation process, a condition where clients no longer need microfinance as they manage to go out of poverty, become a very big deal for the social MFIs.
In contrast, pure business MFIs will likely see the clients as their source of income thus a graduating client means a loss of income. In addition to the less developmental practice, this perception has significant potential to induce other adverse practices that will harm the clients. As profit depends on the clients being in debt, MFIs will flood the poor with high-rate and small-sum loan regardless its developmental effect. Though the poor may be able to repay the small loan, it has taken them deeper and deeper into the valley of debt. The poor become more and more dependant to the MFIs. They are thus able to preserve their profitable customer base whilst the poor unconsciously is preserving their poverty, or worsening perhaps. This seems strengthening the neo-marxist diagnosis suggesting that microfinance has been the new effective tool of capital owners to effectively exploit the poor for profits (Harper, 2010).
On the very end, the social ideology will determine how the MFI’s performance will be evaluated. As profitability is gaining more and more attention, this should not neglect the social performance of the MFI. Since microfinance is aimed to be an empowerment and a development tool to eradicate poverty, the successful of an MFI must be measured in terms of how it can positively affect the economy of its client. Hence, a social performance management process must be embedded in the institution ensuring an effective translation of the social mission into practice creating benefit for the clients[5]. Measuring such a qualitative performance may be a very daunting task, though should not be neglected. The stronger the social value internalized within the MFI, the greater effort will be carried out to conduct social performance evaluation.
Closing remarks: everything but conclusion
Microfinance was started as a social intervention tool to eradicate the poor. It was founded with strong social value and it should remain as it was started despite of the rapid current development. The requirement to be less subsidy-dependent and to adapt regular business practice should not change the fundamental value which previously ignites the existence of the institution. The pursuit of profitability and other business practices must be done within the social paradigm so that the interest of the poor will be preserved.
The poor, no matter how huge and so potential they are to profit, must not be seen only as a market in its very capitalistic term. The lot of lacks that characterized the poor prevents the market force to orderly work which commonly promotes fair trade. The lack of knowledge and wealth often put the poor on the less-fortunate side of trading earning little benefit from the trade. The commercialization trend in microfinance following the entrance of commercial financial institution to the market seems evident the previous argument. As profit will be the ultimate goal of their market expansion, the poor will likely be once again the object of the exploitation of these giants.
The recent development in microfinance not only has brought the optimism that the program is actually gives significant contribution to the effort of having the world without poverty but also exposed the microfinance institution to the risk of mission drift, a condition of deviating from its original social mission. Here, ideology will play as a fundamental capital of keeping the MFI on the right track though it is not entirely sufficient.
Ideology is a conception of how things should normally be on which a conceptual framework of how everything is done is built. In reality, the actual behavior may not align with the conception. Thus, MFIs need to institutionalize their social ideology into a more practical form. Ideology should be translated not only in the institution’s mission and vision statements but also in the model of operation, transaction scheme, product features, procedures, evaluation activity and other management processes.
The inevitably commercialization process also requires a change in the macro level. A government involvement is necessary to set effective and adequate, though not excessive, regulation to ensure the preservation of the poor’s interest and the social objective of microfinance program. This regulation should ensure that the business conducted with the poor is undertaken on a very fair basis where they will obtain the maximum benefit of the microfinance products and services. Public participation should be accommodated to increase market discipline to provide an evaluation and control mechanism to ensure that each microfinance institution operated for the maximum benefit of the poor as the customers.
The above discussion is not intended to be a conclusive one. It would rather be a starting point highlighting a different view to observe the mission drift phenomenon. An empirical investigation may enrich the discussion. An empirical investigation to answer such questions: Are any microfinance models with two bottom-lines really exist? Would it be a faith-based microfinance? Does faith-based microfinance perform better financially and socially? Does commercial microfinance have less contribution to poverty alleviation? Does the commercialization process have any benefit to poor?
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[1] MIV is a form of investment funds and other intermediaries that mobilize investments in rich countries and channel them to microfinance institutions (MFI) in developing countries. (The MicroRate Survey, 2010)
[2] MicroRate 29 is a sample set comprises 29 microfinance institutions which are tracked by MicroRate
[3] Report on the world situation 2010, Department of Economic and Sosial Affairs – United Nation
[4] Carlos Danel is the co-founder of Compartamos Banco and currently serves as its executive vice president. Responding on Compartamos’ controversial initial public offering, Danel states that issue of drifting did not start when the Compartamos did the IPO, it started the day when the institution was founded (http://microfinance.cgap.org/2010/10/25/are-we-drifting-yet/)
[5] The Social Performance Task Force has set this definition of social performance along with the measurement tools
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